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We  incorporate  the  media  priming  effects  to  explain  how  politicians  can  affect  voters' 
preferences  on  issues  during  the  political  campaign.  We  adapt  well-known  terms  of 
international trade, such as absolute advantage and comparative advantage, to the context of 
parties' competition in political issues. We show that when either each party has an absolute 
advantage on a different issue or when parties have "high"  comparative advantage on a 
different issue, the political campaign will consist of issue-emphasis divergence. However, 
when  a  party  has  an  absolute  advantage  on  both  issues  but  the  parties'  comparative 
advantage is not "high enough", the political campaign will consist of issue engagement or 
dialogue. Our results conciliate two separated theories concerning whether there must be 
dialogue or issue-emphasis divergence in the political campaign. 
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The recent political campaigns in modern democracies highlight the fact that
competition of political parties is increasingly based on political issues. We
observe how politicians use political campaigns to promote those issues by
which they can capture a greater amount of voters. Thus, in recent electoral
races (as for instance United States, United Kingdom or Spain), the economic
issue and the position in Iraq￿ s war (or the ￿ght against terrorism) are the
two issues that the media have covered more extensively.
In this paper, we incorporate the media priming e⁄ects to explain the
political parties￿strategy in the political campaign. The media priming is a
way to in￿ uence voters by means of emphasizing some political aspects more
than others. We hypothesize that campaign expenditure a⁄ects the relative
intensity that voters assign to one issue over another. This ability of political
communication to change the salience of consideration in the public￿ s mind
has been demonstrated by several authors (see, e.g. Iyengar and Kinder,
1987, Krosnick and Kinder, 1990, Iyengar and Simon 1993). We show that
there is a direct relation between the ex-ante advantage that a political party
has on an issue and the incentives that this party has to a⁄ect the salience of
such issue. The concepts of absolute advantage and comparative advantage
on a political issue turns out to be crucial to explain when it is in the best
interest of a party to emphasize opposite issues, or to promote dialogue and
debate on certain political issues.
Empirical evidence and theoretical arguments
Authors as West (2000) or Spillotes and Vavreck (2002) analyze campaign
ads and ￿nd that political issues are mentioned in a large number of ads. The
pioneering contributions of Riker (1993) and Petrocik (1996) provide some
ideas on how political parties compete in political issues. From the analysis
of the national campaign of the U.S. for the rati￿cation of the Constitution,
Riker (1993) argues that, (i) when one party has a clear-cut advantage on
an issue, it regularly emphasizes that issue while the other party abandons
it (dominance principle) and, (ii) when neither side has a clear advantage on
an issue, both abandon it (dispersion principle). In a similar vein, from the
analysis of the U.S. presidential elections between 1960 and 1992, Petrocik
(1996) provides the idea of ￿issue ownership￿ , which is based on the percep-
tion that voters have as to how a party handles certain political issues (or
political problems). A party has ownership of an issue when the voters view
2it as better quali￿ed to handle that issue. Thus, it would be rational for each
side to keep the campaign focused on the issue that it owns and to avoid
those issues owned by its opponent.
There is an interesting recent debate on whether there is dialogue or
issue-divergence on political issues between the parties￿candidates during
the political campaign. On the one hand, Kaplan, Park and Ridout (2006)
contrast the issue ownership theory proposed by Petrocik. They ￿nd that
the issue engagement or dialogue occurs very frequently. In the same vein,
Sigelman and Buell (2004) study the percentage of time that a candidate
is engaged in discussion of issues owned by the other political party. They
demonstrate a high degree of similarity on the issue emphasis. On the other
hand, Spillotes and Vavreck (2002) and Simon (2002) ￿nd evidence on issue
emphasis divergence, i.e., they ￿nd that candidates from di⁄erent parties do
choose to emphasize di⁄erent issues. In fact, Simon (2002) justi￿es that,
since no issue can work to the advantage of both candidates then, rational
candidates will never dialogue.
From a theoretical point of view, Riker (1993), Simon (2002) and Austen-
Smith (1993), justify that opponent political parties will emphasize di⁄erent
issues (orthogonal issues in Austen-Smith￿ s terminology). However, from an
empirical point of view, Sigelman and Buell (2004) ￿nd that a high degree
of similarity in the issue emphasis of both political parties appears to have
been the norm in U.S. campaigns.
Thus, we ￿nd that there is enough evidence on parties emphasizing polit-
ical issues, and that parties may select one of the following strategies: issue
engagement or issue divergence. However, so far, there is no unanimous
agreement on what norm should follow the parties. While the theoretical
works can only justify issue emphasis divergence, there is enough empirical
evidence on both, issue divergence and dialogue.
An outline of the model
In this paper, we provide a simple theoretical model that tries to capture
the basic features of priming in the political campaign. Our model is based
on the one of Riker and Ordeshook (1973). We extend this model to allow
for the e⁄ect of campaign expenditure a⁄ecting the salience of the political
issues.
We consider a two-dimensional spatial model of political competition be-
tween two parties. The parties￿political positions are common knowledge.
Parties aim at maximizing votes. Voters are represented by their own ideal
3policies, and they vote sincerely for the party that matches their own ideal
policy more accurately.1 The strategies of the parties consist of allocating
campaign funds between the political issues. In this way, the parties a⁄ect
the relative importance that voters assign to one of the political issues over
the other. We study the equilibria of this allocation of campaign funds game.2
We ￿nd that both types of strategies, issue divergence and dialogue, can
be supported as equilibrium strategies, depending on the absolute advantage
and comparative advantage of the parties on each of the political issues. We
show that when either each party has an absolute advantage on a di⁄erent
issue or when parties have high comparative advantage on a di⁄erent issue,
the political campaign will consist of issue-emphasis divergence. However,
when a party has an absolute advantage on both issues but its comparative
advantage on each issue is not high enough, there will be dialogue and issue-
engagement in the political campaign.
Related literature
There are several theories that explain how political campaign expendi-
ture persuades voters: (1) campaign expenditure in￿ uences a ￿xed fraction
of voters who are uninformed about the parties￿political positions (see, e.g.,
Baron, 1994, and Grossman and Helpman, 1996); (2) campaign expenditure
clari￿es the political positions of the candidates and alleviates risk averse vot-
ers￿uncertainty (see, e.g., Austen-Smith, 1987); (3) campaign expenditure
is a signal of the high valence of an incumbent candidate (see, e.g., Prat,
2002); (4) campaign expenditure a⁄ects an ￿electoral production function￿
and increases the probability of winning the elections (see, e.g., Friedman,
1958, Brams and Davis, 1973, Snyder, 1989).3 Explanations (1) and (2)
relate campaign activities to information acquisition, Explanation (3) inter-
prets campaign expenditure as a signal, and Explanation (4) provides a more
1We follow the proximity model where preferences on political parties follow directly
from ￿closeness￿ . The directional model proposed by Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989)
is an alternative where preferences are de￿ned by one direction on the policy space.
2One could think that our campaign game is the second stage of a two-stage game
where there are two types of political issues: ideological and non-ideological. The parties￿
positions on ideological issues are ￿xed irrevocably, while they can choose their positions
on non-ideological issues. In the ￿rst stage of the game the parties competed in terms of
platform positioning on non-ideological issues (if both parties locate at the median of each
non-ideological issue, these issues would become irrelevant in the second stage).
3As pointed out by Snyder (1989), the rent-seeking literature provides a particular
instance of an ￿electoral production function￿ . See, for instance, Tullock (1981).
4general setting where campaign activities work as an input to produce votes.
The main di⁄erence between this literature and the present paper is that
we incorporate the priming e⁄ects to explain how political parties persuade
voters.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
model. Section 3 analyzes the equilibrium strategies. Section 4 provides the
conclusions. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The model
A society with a continuum of voters shall select a representative to serve
in the legislature by popular election. Two political parties, A and B; with
￿xed political positions on a two-dimensional policy space, aim at maximizing
votes by spending campaign resources. Two political issues, 1 and 2, describe
two salient problems of the society.4
Political parties
Each party j 2 fA;Bg has a ￿xed and known political position xj =
(xj1;xj2) 2 [0;1]2; where xjr 2 [0;1] is the political position of party j on
issue r 2 f1;2g. We assume, without loss of generality, that xA1 < xB1 and
xA2 < xB2.5
Each party j is endowed with some ￿xed campaign funds ￿ cj > 0. Cam-
paign funds are devoted to the advertising campaign and each party empha-
sizes those issues that can persuade a greater amount of voters.6 We de￿ne
a campaign strategy of party j as a vector cj 2 Cj = f(cj1;cj2) 2 R2
+ :
cj1+cj2 = ￿ cjg, which indicates how the party allocates its funds between the
two di⁄erent issues.7 Let c = (cA;cB) 2 CA ￿ CB = C denote a pro￿le of
4As pointed out by authors as Poole and Rosenthal (1991), adding a third dimension
may explain little more.
5As argued by Simon (2002), the assumption that candidates￿positions are ￿xed for
the duration of the campaign ￿re￿ ects empirical evidence, which shows that it is di¢ cult
to alter voters￿perceptions of a candidate￿ s positions￿ .
6In the same vein, Roemer (1998) argues that political parties try to increase the
salience of some issues as a mean of pulling voters away from the other competing party.
7Assuming that the parties exhaust their budgets should not raise concerns. We could
think that the campaign funds are the result of a previous competition for donations
between the parties, and assume that the parties cannot put this money to a better use.
All our results can be generalized to the case where the space of strategies is such that
5campaign strategies. For each c 2 C and each r 2 f1;2g, let cr = cAr + cBr
be the total funds spent on issue r.8
Voters
Each voter i has a ￿xed and known ideal political position ￿i =
(￿i1;￿i2) 2 [0;1]2 where ￿ir 2 [0;1] is the ideal political position of voter
i on issue r. Voters￿ideal political positions are uniformly distributed on
[0;1]2. Note that the median voter￿ s ideal policy is (1
2; 1
2):
Each voter prefers the party that matches his own ideal policy more
accurately. Besides that, campaign strategies also have an in￿ uence on voters￿
preferences. Thus, one of the crucial assumptions of this model is that the
intensity of voters￿preferences over each issue r depends on the campaign
expenditure on that issue, cr. In particular, the following utility function
represents the preferences of each voter i over the political parties:
ui(j;c) = ￿￿1(c1)[xj1 ￿ ￿i1]
2 ￿ ￿2(c2)[xj2 ￿ ￿i2]
2 (1)
where, for each issue r, ￿r(:) is a continuously di⁄erentiable function of the
campaign expenditure on issue r that indicates the weight that voters assign
to that issue. We will refer to ￿r(:) as the in￿ uence function on issue r;
where ￿r(0) > 0 and
@￿r(cr)
@cr > 0. Note that we have made the simplifying
assumption that all voters are equally in￿ uenced by the campaign expendi-
ture, i.e., for any issue r, the in￿ uence function ￿r(:) does not vary among
voters. This assumption can be justi￿ed on the basis that all voters have
equal access to advertising activities. Riker and Ordeshook (1973) pointed
out that a relaxation that is generally permitted consists of considering that
there exists some average level of concern for each of the issues.9
Figure 1 illustrates an example of voters￿indi⁄erence curves. The solid
curves represent the indi⁄erence curves when there is no campaign expen-
diture. Expending campaign funds can vary the relative importance that
voters assign to each issue. Thus, the narrow doted curves represent the
indi⁄erence curves when campaign expenditure makes issue 1 more relevant,
cj1 + cj2 ￿ ￿ cj.
8We can also interpret the campaign strategy cj as the time that party j devotes to
advertising each political issue.
9Note also that, while the campaign expenditure determines the intensity of voters￿
preferences over issues, it has no in￿ uence on their ideal political positions. This restriction
is probably the smallest step one could take to analyze the e⁄ect of campaign expenditure








Figure 1. Example of voters’indifference curves.
while the wide doted curves represent the indi⁄erence curves when campaign
expenditure makes issue 2 more relevant.
Given any pro￿le of campaign strategies c 2 C, voter i casts his ballot
for party j when ui(j;c) > ui(k;c) (where k 6= j). We can rewrite the utility
function of voter i:
ui(j;c) = ￿T(c)[xj1 ￿ ￿i1]




￿2(c2) can be interpreted as the relative intensity of voters￿
preferences over issue 1 when the pro￿le of campaign strategies is c. Thus,
the greater T(c) is, the more relevant issue 1 is compared to issue 2 in voters￿
preferences.
From (2), voter i is indi⁄erent between the two parties when his ideal












7Equation 3 allows us to distinguish between those voters that vote for
party A and those voters that vote for party B. Figure 2 shows an example
of that. In a slight abuse of notation, we use T(c) to denote the line de￿ned
by Equation 3. Any voter whose ideal political position is located on this
line is indi⁄erent between the two parties. If the ideal political position of a
voter is located below that line, he votes for party A. Similarly, if the ideal
political position of a voter is located above that line, he votes for party B.
Issue 1
Issue 2









Voters of party B




Since each party j can expend at most ￿ cj on an issue, we have
￿1(0)
￿2(￿ cA+￿ cB) 6
T(c) 6
￿1(￿ cA+￿ cB)
￿2(0) , for all c 2 C. We denote Tmin =
￿1(0)
￿2(￿ cA+￿ cB) and Tmax =
￿1(￿ cA+￿ cB)
￿2(0) the minimum and maximum values of T(c). These values are the
key to knowing the subgroup of voters that may change their vote according
to the speci￿c pro￿le of campaign strategies. A voter located in the midpoint
of the distance between the political position of party A and party B is
always indi⁄erent between both parties, whatever the campaign strategies




2 ) denote the midpoint of the parties￿
political positions. Note the mr can be interpreted as the percentage of votes
8that party A would obtain if voters only cared about issue r (and therefore,
(1 ￿ mr) is the percentage of votes that party B would obtain if voters only
cared about issue r).
Consider the example depicted in Figure 3. Again, we abuse of notation
and use Tmin and Tmax to denote the lines de￿ned by Expression 3 when
T(c) = Tmin and T(c) = Tmax, respectively. Any voter whose ideal political
position is located below lines Tmin and Tmax is such that ui(A;c) > ui(B;c)
for all c 2 C, and then he always votes for party A, no matter what the
pro￿le of campaign strategies is. Similarly, any voter whose ideal political
position is located above lines Tmin and Tmax is such that ui(B;c) > ui(A;c)











Partisan voters of B





Any voter located between lines Tmin and Tmax is such that ui(A;c) >
ui(B;c) for some c 2 C and ui(B;c0) > ui(A;c0) for some c0 2 C, and then
his vote will depend on the particular pro￿le of campaign strategies. We
call these voters issue voters. The campaign expenditure on a particular
9issue can move the vote of an issue voter towards the party that best ￿ts his
preferences on that issue. Note that
@Tmin
@(￿ cA+￿ cB) < 0 and @Tmax
@(￿ cA+￿ cB) > 0, and then,
the greater the campaign funds are, the greater the set of issue voters is.10
Campaign game
Each party objective is maximizing votes.11 Given any pro￿le of campaign
strategies c 2 C, let Vj(c) be the percentage of votes that party j obtains
in the elections. Our equilibrium concept in this paper is Nash equilibrium.
A pro￿le of campaign strategies c￿ 2 C is a (Nash) equilibrium if, for all
party j and all c0




k) (where k 6= j).
3 Results
3.1 Equilibrium existence
We ￿rst show existence of equilibrium. For that, we need to study the votes
that each party obtains as a function of their campaign strategies. To simplify
our notation, for each issue r 2 f1;2g, let xr = xAr ￿ xBr:
Lemma 1 The percentage of votes for party A as a function of the campaign
strategies, VA(c), is such that,
(1) if m1 + m2 ￿ 1, then:
VA(c) =
8
> > > <





















T(c)x1 ; if T(c) ￿
x2[1￿m2]
x1m1
10Baron (1994), Grossman and Helpman (1996) consider an exogenous fraction of voters
that can be in￿ uenced by the political campaign (the so called impressionable voters by
Grossman a Helpman and uninformed voters by Baron). In contrast, our issue-voters are
informed and do have an ideal political position.
11In a previous version of this paper (Amor￿s and Puy, 2004), we analyzed the case
where parties only cared about winning the elections.
10(2) if m1 + m2 ￿ 1, then:
VA(c) =
8
> > > > <




x2 ; if T(c) ￿
x2[1￿m2]
x1m1













T(c)x1 ; if T(c) ￿
x2m2
x1[1￿m1]:
The vote functions VA(:) and VB(:) = 1￿VA(:) are continuous and, since
the space of strategies CA and CB are compact, we can a¢ rm that the cam-
paign game always possesses a Nash equilibrium (see, for example, Glicks-
berg, 1952).
Theorem 1 The campaign game always has an equilibrium.
As it follows from the functions VA(:) and VB(:) = 1 ￿ VA(:) described in
Lemma 1, the percentage of votes obtained by each party not only depends
on the campaign strategies, but also on the political position of the par-
ties. Next, we characterize the equilibrium strategies in terms of the parties￿
advantage on each of the issues.
3.2 Equilibrium strategies
The campaign strategies indicate how the parties allocate its funds between
the two di⁄erent issues. Following the terminology of previous authors (Si-
mon 2002, Sigelman and Buell 2004, Kaplan et al. 2006), we distinguish
between two di⁄erent types of political campaigns: those where there is issue
divergence (or no dialogue) between the political parties, and those where
there is issue engagement (or dialogue) between the political parties.
De￿nition 1 We say that there is issue divergence in the political cam-
paign when the unique equilibrium of the campaign game is a pure strategy
equilibrium where each party spends all its campaign funds on a di⁄erent
issue.
De￿nition 2 We say that there is issue engagement in the political
campaign when any equilibrium of the campaign game assigns positive prob-
ability to both parties spending campaign funds on the same issue.12
12Note that, in general, the fact that there is no issue divergence would not necessarily
imply that there is issue engagement. In this model, however, we ￿nd that this is the case.
11When there is issue divergence in the political campaign, each political
party emphasizes a di⁄erent political issue. Next, we show that there is
a direct relation between the advantage that each party has on each of the
political issues, and the political campaigns characterized by issue divergence.
De￿nition 3 We say that a party has an absolute advantage on issue











A has an absolute
advantage on issue 1
B has an absolute
advantage on issue 1
A has an absolute
advantage on issue 2
B has an absolute
advantage on issue 2
m1
m2
In other words, a party has an absolute advantage on an issue if its
political position on that issue is closer than the one of its rival to the ideal
political position of the median voter on that issue. Therefore, if the midpoint
of the parties￿political positions on issue r, is greater (respectively smaller)
than the ideal political position of the median voter on that issue (i.e., mr >
1
2) then party A (respectively party B) has an absolute advantage on issue
r.13 In Figure 4, we distinguish four di⁄erent areas depending on the location
13If mr > 1










￿. Similarly, if mr < 1
2 then ￿ ￿xAr ￿ 1
2
￿ ￿ >
￿ ￿xBr ￿ 1
2
￿ ￿.
12of the midpoint (m1;m2).
As we next show, when each party has an absolute advantage on a di⁄er-
ent issue (Areas 2 and 4 in Figure 4), each party spends all its funds on the
issue in which it has an absolute advantage.
Proposition 1 When each party has an absolute advantage on a di⁄erent
issue, there is issue divergence in the political campaign, and each party em-
phasizes the issue where it has an absolute advantage.
In the proof of Proposition 1, we show that the voting function of each
party is an increasing function of the campaign expenditure on the issue in
which it has an absolute advantage. Therefore, each party has a strictly
dominant strategy that consists of spending all its campaign funds on the
issue where it has an absolute advantage.14
Next, we analyze the case in which the same party has an absolute ad-
vantage on both issues (Areas 1 and 3 in Figure 4).
Proposition 2 When party j has an absolute advantage on both political











￿ Vj(Tmin), where k 6= j (in the ￿rst
case party j emphasizes issue 1 while in the second case it emphasizes issue
2). Otherwise, there is issue engagement in the political campaign.
In the proof of Proposition 2 we show that, if party j has an absolute
advantage on both issues, then Vj is a single-peaked function of T(c) (and,
therefore, the voting function of its opponent is a single-dipped function of
T(c)). There is no equilibrium where the vote-share of party j coincides with
the peak of its voting function. As a consequence, the only two possible









B2)) = ((0;￿ cA);(￿ cB;0)). We characterize the situations
where pure strategy equilibria exist and show that, in these cases, the equilib-
rium is unique (i.e., there is no other equilibrium in pure or mixed strategies).
Thus, in these situations there is issue divergence in the political campaign.
14When either m1 = 1
2 and m2 < 1
2 or m1 > 1
2 and m2 = 1
2; the function VA(:) is
weakly increasing and (c￿
A1;c￿
A2) = (￿ cA;0) (c￿
B1;c￿
B2) = (0;￿ cB) is an equilibrium but it
may not be the unique equilibrium. In the same way, when either m1 = 1
2 and m2 > 1
2
or m1 < 1
2 and m2 = 1
2; the function VA(:) is weakly decreasing and (c￿
A1;c￿
A2) = (0;￿ cA)
(c￿
B1;c￿
B2) = (￿ cB;0) is an equilibrium but it may not be unique.
13When equilibria in pure strategies fail to exist, by Theorem 1, there exist
equilibria in mixed strategies. Note that any equilibrium in mixed strategies
assigns positive probability to both parties spending campaign funds on the
same issue. Therefore, in these situations there is issue engagement in the
political campaign.
The following notion of comparative advantage, will help us to de￿ne
the borderline between issue divergence (pure strategy equilibrium) and is-
sue engagement (mixed strategy equilibrium). The comparative advantage
measures the relative advantage that a party has on an issue over the other.
De￿nition 4 The comparative advantage of party j on issue r is the
di⁄erence between the percentage of votes that party j would obtain if voters
only cared about issue r and the the percentage of votes that it would obtain
if voters only cared about issue s (s 6= r). In particular, the comparative
advantage of party A on issue r is mr ￿ ms, and the comparative advantage
of party B on issue r is (1 ￿ mr) ￿ (1 ￿ ms) = ms ￿ mr.
m2
Figure 5. Comparative advantage
A has positive comparative
advantage on issue 1
B has positive comparative
advantage on issue 2
A has positive comparative
advantage on issue 2
B has positive comparative
advantage on issue 1
m1
14Note that the comparative advantage of party A on issue r coincides
with the comparative advantage of party B on issue s. When party A has
positive comparative advantage on issue r, party B has positive comparative
advantage on issue s. Figure 5 illustrates this notion.
As we show in the following proposition, when a party has an absolute
advantage on both issues, a high comparative advantage guarantees that in
equilibrium there is issue divergence in the political campaign.
Proposition 3 Suppose that party j has an absolute advantage on both po-
litical issues. If the comparative advantage of party j on issue r is ￿high
enough￿ , there is issue divergence in the political campaign (party j empha-
sizes issue r and the other party emphasizes issue s, s 6= r).
In the proof of this proposition we show that, given ms, there always exists
some value for mr such that the comparative advantage of party j on issue r
is su¢ ciently large to guarantee that there exists unique equilibrium in pure
strategies where party j spends all its funds on issue r and the other party
spends all its funds on issue s. Our next result shows that such an equilibrium
keeps existing (and is unique) as the comparative advantage of party j on
issue r increases. On the other hand, if ms increases then an equilibrium
in pure strategies fails to exist at some point. Of course, if ms continues
increasing, then, by Proposition 3, the equilibrium in pure strategies comes
again into the scene (in this case, however, party j spends all its funds on
issue s, and its opponent on issue r).
Proposition 4 Suppose that there is a party that has an absolute advantage
on both political issues and that there is issue divergence in the political cam-
paign where party j emphasizes issue r. Then:
(1) If the comparative advantage of party j on issue r increases because either
mr or ms is modi￿ed (keeping constant the rest of parameters), there is still
issue divergence in the political campaign where party j emphasizes issue r.
(2) If the comparative advantage of party j on issue r decreases (keeping con-
stant mr and the rest of parameters), at some point there is issue engagement
in the political campaign.15
15In particular, in statement (1), mr (respectively ms) changes, while ms (respectively
mr), x1 and x2 do not change. In statement (2), ms changes, while mr, x1 and x2 do not
change.
15This proposition allows us to de￿ne the borderline between issue diver-
gence (pure strategy equilibrium) and issue engagement (mixed strategy equi-
librium). Figure 6 provides a particular example (explained in detail in the
next section). The shadowed area represents the midpoints of the parties￿po-
litical positions for which there is issue engagement in the political campaign.
This shadowed area may not always be symmetric around the diagonal and it
may not necessarily contain the diagonal (remember that the in￿ uence func-
tions may di⁄er across issues, and that parties￿campaign expenditure can be
di⁄erent). We know however from Proposition 4, that this shadowed area is
always located in Areas 1 and 3 de￿ned in Figure 4, and in between the two
di⁄erent types of pure strategy equilibria (the one where party j emphasizes
issue 1, and the other where party j emphasizes issue 2). By Proposition
4 we know that this shadowed area will never include those locations where
the parties have ￿high￿comparative advantage.
1/2
1/2

















163.3 The symmetric case
To illustrate what happens when a party has an absolute advantage on both
issues, we analyze in this subsection the simple case in which the in￿ uence
functions are equal, ￿1(:) = ￿2(:), and both parties have the same amount




￿2(￿ cA) = 1 and
Tmin < 1 < Tmax.
Suppose, without loss of generality, that party A has an absolute advan-
tage on both issues. Then, VA is the function described in the second part of
Lemma 1. By Propositions 2 and 4, the expressions VA(
￿1(￿ cB)
￿2(￿ cA)) = VA(Tmin)
and VA(
￿1(￿ cA)
￿2(￿ cB)) = VA(Tmax) de￿ne the border between the pure and the mixed
strategy equilibrium. Next, we calculate the values of m1 and m2 de￿ned by
these expressions.
Assume for simplicity that x1 = x2 (where xr = xAr ￿ xBr). Then
1￿m2
m1 ￿ 1 ￿
m2
1￿m1 and the percentage of votes obtained by party A when
T(c) =
￿1(￿ cA)
￿2(￿ cB) = 1 is:





Since Tmin ￿ 1 ￿
m2
1￿m1, when calculating the percentage of votes obtained
by party A if T(c) = Tmin we can ignore the last part of the function described










; if Tmin ￿
1￿m2
m1











x1m1 ￿ 1 ￿ Tmax, the percentage of votes obtained by
party A when T(c) = Tmax is:
VA(Tmax) =
8
> > > <
> > > :

















17From Expressions 4 and 5, the values of m1 and m2 for which VA(
￿1(￿ cB)
￿2(￿ cA)) =





1 ￿ m1 + [Tmin ￿ 1 + 2m1 ￿ 2m1Tmin]












The function described in Expression 7 is continuous, increasing in m1 and
concave. From Expressions 4 and 6, the values of m1 and m2 for which
VA(
￿1(￿ cA)
￿2(￿ cB)) = VA(Tmax) are de￿ned by a function which is symmetric to the





1 ￿ m2 +
h
1




















Using a similar reasoning, we can obtain the analogous to Expressions 7
and 8 for the case in which party B has an advantage on both issues. In
Figure 6, we represent all these functions.
Figure 7. Mixed-strategy equilibrium expansion













18Suppose that both parties￿campaign funds increase by the same amount.
Then Tmin decreases, Tmax increases and, therefore, the area in which there
is no equilibrium in pure strategies spans (see Figure 7).
3.4 Equilibrium strategies under dialogue
Suppose that there is issue engagement in the political campaign. So far, we
have shown that this is possible only if one of the parties has an absolute
advantage on both political issues and it has not a ￿large￿comparative ad-
vantage on any issue. In this case, there is no equilibrium in pure strategies.
Next, we describe an equilibrium in mixed strategies that always exists in
this situation.
Equilibrium strategies:
- The party with an absolute advantage on both issues plays a pure strat-
egy where it spends campaign funds on both issues.
- The other party randomizes between spending all its funds on issue 1
or spending all its funds on issue 2.16
Note that any realization of these equilibrium strategies is such that there
is one issue where both parties spend funds on.
Consider, without loss of generality, that party A has an absolute advan-
tage on both political issues. As we show in the proof of Proposition 2, the
percentage of votes of party A, VA; is a single-peaked function of T(c), with
peak T P =
1￿m2
1￿m1.17 We have Tmin < T P < Tmax (otherwise, the only equilib-
rium is in pure strategies and there is no issue engagement). For simplicity,
let us rede￿ne a pure strategy for party j as cj1 2 [0;￿ cj] (then cj2 = ￿ cj ￿cj1).
It can be shown that the best response function of party A, cA1 = fA(cB1),
is continuous and decreasing.
The percentage of votes of party B, VB(:), is a single-dipped function of
T(c). Thus, party B￿ s best response, cB1 = fB(cA1), is such that either it
spends all its funds on issue 1 or it spends all its funds on issue 2, i.e., there
16To give an example, suppose that m1 = m2 = m > 1
2, ￿ cj = ￿ c and ￿j(c) = k+cj1+cj1
where k >
￿ c(2￿2m)
2m￿1 for j 2 fA;Bg. Then, the proposed equilibrium is given by cA = ( ￿ c
2; ￿ c
2),
and party B randomizing between cB = (￿ c;0) and c0
B = (0;￿ c) with probability p = 1
2.
17When comparing di⁄erent political positions of the political parties, we consider for
the sake of simplicity that x1 = x2:
19is some ^ cA 2 [0;￿ cA] such that:
fB(cA1) =
￿
0 ; if cA1 ￿ ^ cA
￿ cB ; if cA1 ￿ ^ cA
(9)
Since we are assuming that there is issue engagement in the political cam-
paign, then there is no pure strategy equilibrium (we have shown in the
proof of Proposition 2 that any equilibrium in pure strategies is such that
each party spends all its funds on a di⁄erent issue, and that if such an
equilibrium exists, it is unique). Therefore ^ cA 6= 0, ^ cA 6= ￿ cA, and when
cA1 = ^ cA, party B is indi⁄erent between spending all its funds on issue 1
or spending all its funds on issue 2. Let T1 = T((^ cA1;￿ cA ￿ ^ cA1);(0;￿ cB)) and
T2 = T((^ cA1;￿ cA ￿ ^ cA1);(￿ cB;0)). Then, VB(T1) = VB(T2) and, since VB(:) is
single-dipped, T1 < T P < T2.
Consider the following strategies: party A plays the pure strategy cA1 =
^ cA, and party B plays cB1 = 0 with probability p 2 (0;1) and c0
B1 = ￿ cB with
probability (1 ￿ p). Next, we show that there always exists some p 2 (0;1)
such that these strategies are an equilibrium.
Given party B￿ s strategy, party A￿ s strategy should satisfy that
^ cA 2 argmax
cA12[0;￿ cA]
pVA((cA1;￿ cA￿cA1);(0;￿ cB))+(1￿p)VA((cA1;￿ cA￿cA1);(￿ cB;0))
(10)
Solving Expression 10, and substituting cA1 = ^ cA; we have
p
@VA(T1)
@cA1 + (1 ￿ p)
@VA(T2)












where T1 < T P < T2 implies that
@VA(T1)
@cA1 > 0 and
@VA(T2)
@cA1 < 0, and therefore
p 2 (0;1).
Therefore, when there is issue engagement in the political campaign, there
is always an equilibrium where the party with an absolute advantage on both
issues spends funds on both issues, whereas its opponent randomizes between
spending all its funds on one or the other political issue. We do not discard
the existence of other equilibria in mixed strategies. However, the proposed
equilibrium is the only one where one of the parties plays a pure strategy.
204 Conclusion
This paper proposes a theoretical model of political competition where prim-
ing e⁄ects determine the strategies of the electoral campaign. In doing so, we
have focused on the role that the advertising campaign plays on the weight
that voters employ to evaluate political actors. By means of a⁄ecting the
salience of certain political issues, parties can modify in its favor the electoral
results. We show that, depending on the absolute and the comparative ad-
vantage of the parties on the political issues, we can describe when we should
expect dialogue or issue emphasis divergence in the political campaign.
We say that a party has an absolute advantage on an issue when such
party would obtain a simple majority on the one-issue election. The compar-
ative advantage on an issue is given by the relative percentage of votes that
a party would obtain on that issue with respect to the other issue.
The equilibrium obtained when each party has an absolute advantage on
a di⁄erent issue is coherent with the empirical evidence on ￿issue emphasis
divergence￿as proposed by Simon (2002) and Spillotes and Vavreck (2002).
In fact, we ￿nd that the unique equilibrium strategy consists of emphasizing
the issue in which the party has an absolute advantage. The obtained equi-
librium is along the lines of the ￿dominance principle￿suggested by Riker
(1993) and of the ￿issue-ownership￿theory proposed by Petrocik (1996).
When a party has an absolute advantage on both issues we can have two
di⁄erent situations. If the parties comparative advantage is ￿high￿ , then
there is a unique pure strategy equilibrium where each party emphasizes
a di⁄erent issue (the one in which it has a comparative advantage). If,
however, the parties￿comparative advantage is not high enough, then there
is no pure strategy equilibrium, but there are mixed strategy equilibria. In
this case, there always exists a mixed strategy equilibrium where a party
emphasizes both issues and the other randomizes between spending all its
funds on one or the other issue. The mixed strategy equilibria are along the
lines of the empirical evidence on ￿issue engagement￿defended by Kaplan,
Park and Ridout (2006), Sigelman and Buell (2004), since these equilibria
always assign a positive probability to both parties spending campaign funds
on the same issue. Furthermore, the larger amount of campaign funds, the
higher probability of issue engagement.
The predictions of our model are to some extent in line with the theory
on international trade developed by David Ricardo (1821). From Ricardo￿ s
Law, a country should specialize in and export those products where it has
21a comparative advantage, even when the country has no absolute advantage
when it manufactures a product. In our model of political campaign, we
show that when each party has an absolute advantage on a di⁄erent issue,
they should specialize on the issues where they have an absolute advantage.
In the same way, when one party has an absolute advantage on both issues
(and so its opponent does not have an absolute advantage on any issue) and
each party has high comparative advantage on a di⁄erent issue, then each
party should specialize on the issue where it has high comparative advan-
tage. However, we depart from Ricardo￿ s Law when the same party has an
absolute advantage on both issues but the comparative advantage is ￿low￿ :
this party shall promote dialogue in the political campaign by emphasizing
both political issues simultaneously.
Extensions which account for more than two political parties, or which
distinguish among groups of voters who weight issues di⁄erently (as for in-
stance gender or race groups) may also shed some light in the electoral results
derived from parties￿competition in political issues.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF LEMMA 1:
From Expression 3, a voter i will vote for party A if and only if his ideal
political position satis￿es the following condition:
T(c)[xA1￿xB1]






2[xA2￿xB2] < 0 (13)









2[xA2￿xB2] . The distribution function of Yi is:
F(y) =
8
> > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > :
0 ; if y ￿ ￿￿(c)
[y+￿(c)]2
2￿(c) ; if ￿￿(c) ￿ y ￿minf1;￿(c)g ￿ ￿(c)
2y+2￿(c)￿minf1;￿(c)g
2maxf1;￿(c)g





; if maxf1;￿(c)g ￿ ￿(c) ￿ y ￿
1 + ￿(c) ￿ ￿(c)
1 ; if y ￿ 1 + ￿(c) ￿ ￿(c)
(14)
22Evaluating the previous distribution function in zero, we obtain the percent-




> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0 ; if ￿(c) ￿ 0
￿(c)2
2￿(c) ; if 0 ￿ ￿(c) ￿minf1;￿(c)g
2￿(c)￿minf1;￿(c)g
2maxf1;￿(c)g ; if minf1;￿(c)g ￿ ￿(c) ￿maxf1;￿(c)g
1 ￿
[￿(c)￿￿(c)+1]2
2￿(c) ; if maxf1;￿(c)g ￿ ￿(c) ￿ 1 + ￿(c)
1 ; if ￿(c) ￿ 1 + ￿(c)
(15)
Let x1 = xA1￿xB1; x2 = xA2￿xB2. Note that the following relations are
satis￿ed:
(i) 0 ￿ ￿(c) ￿ 1 + ￿(c) for all c,18
(ii) ￿(c) ￿ 1 if and only if T(c) ￿
x2
x1,
(iii) 0 ￿ ￿(c) ￿ 1 if and only if T(c) ￿
x2[1￿m2]
x1m1 ,








(v) ￿(c) ￿ ￿(c) ￿ 1 + ￿(c) if and only if T(c) ￿
x2m2
x1[1￿m1],
(vi) 0 ￿ ￿(c) ￿ ￿(c) if and only if T(c) ￿
x2m2
x1[1￿m1],








(viii) 1 ￿ ￿(c) ￿ 1 + ￿(c) if and only if T(c) ￿
x2[1￿m2]
x1m1 .
Then, we can rewrite Expression 15:
VA(c)=
8
> > > > > > > > > > <


























































18Note that ￿(c) < 0 if and only if T(c) < ￿x2m2
x1m1 ￿ 0, which never occurs, since




















x1m1 if and only if m1 +m2 ￿ 1. Therefore, VA(c) is
given by the expressions in the statement of this lemma.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
We need the following lemma to prove the proposition.
Lemma 2 If each party has an absolute advantage on a di⁄erent issue, then
the percentage of voters that cast their ballots for the party that has an ab-
solute advantage on issue 1 is a strictly increasing function of T(c).
Proof. Suppose, without loss of generality, that party A has an absolute
advantage on issue 1 and party B has an absolute advantage on issue 2. We





> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
x1[m1￿ 1
2]





































Since m1 > 1
2 it follows that
x1[m1￿ 1
2]













x1m1 < T(c) <
x2m2















x1[1￿m1] < T(c) <
x2[1￿m2]










Now, we proceed with the proof of Proposition 1.
Suppose, without loss of generality, that party A has an absolute advan-
tage on issue 1 and party B has an absolute advantage on issue 2. Hence,
m1 > 1
2 and m2 < 1
2. By Lemma 2, the payo⁄ function of party A is strictly
increasing in T(c), and therefore (c￿
A1;c￿
A2) = (￿ cA;0) is a strictly dominant
24strategy for party A and (c￿
B1;c￿
B2) = (0;￿ cB) is a strictly dominant strategy
for party B.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
We need a previous lemma to prove this proposition.
Lemma 3 If a party has an absolute advantage on both political issues, then
the percentage of voters that cast their ballots for that party is a single-peaked
function of T(c).
Proof. Suppose, without loss of generality, that party A has an absolute
advantage on both issues. We will show that VA is a strictly increasing
function of T(c) for all T(c) <
x2[1￿m2]




If party A has an absolute advantage on both issues then m1 + m2 > 1
(since m1 > 1
2 and m2 > 1





















































x1[1￿m1], then the derivative
@VA(c)
@T(c) is given by Expression 18. Since
T(c) >
x2[1￿m2]
x1[1￿m1]; it follows that
@VA(c)












We now proceed with the proof of Proposition 2.
Suppose, without loss of generality, that m1 > 1
2 and m2 > 1
2, i.e., party
A has an absolute advantage on both issues.
First, we show that every equilibrium in pure strategies is such that each
party spends all its campaign funds on a di⁄erent issue. By Lemma 3, VA(:) is
25a single-peaked function of T(c) (and then VB(:) is a single-dipped function
of T(c)). Let T P = argmax
T(c)2[Tmin;Tmax]
VA(T(c)) (i.e., T P is the peak of VA(:)).
Let c￿ 2 C be a pure strategy equilibrium. We show that T(c￿) 6= T P.
Suppose on the contrary that T P = T(c￿): Then, any change in T(c) increases
party B￿ s vote-share. Therefore c￿
B is not the best response to c￿
A, which
is a contradiction. Suppose now that T(c￿) < T P. Then, any increase
(respectively decrease) in T(c) would make party A￿ s vote-share (respectively
party B￿ s vote share) to increase. Therefore c￿
A = (￿ cA;0), c￿
B = (0;￿ cB)
(otherwise c￿ was not an equilibrium). Similarly, if T P < T(c￿), then any
decrease (respectively increase) in T(c) would make party A￿ s vote-share
(respectively party B￿ s vote share) to increase.19 Therefore c￿
A = (0;￿ cA),
c￿
B = (￿ cB;0) (otherwise c￿ was not an equilibrium).











￿ VA(Tmin). By Lemma
3, VA(:) is a single-peaked function of T(c) (and VB(:) is a single-dipped




















A2)) = ((0;￿ cA);(￿ cB;0)) is an equi-





















A2)) = ((￿ cA;0);(0;￿ cB)) is not an equilibrium
(given the strategy of party A, party B could increase its vote-share by










A2)) = ((0;￿ cA);(￿ cB;0)) is
not an equilibrium (given the strategy of party A, party B could increase its
vote-share by spending all its funds on issue 2). Then, it follows that there
is no equilibrium in pure strategies.
Third, we show that if there exists an equilibrium in pure strategies,






we have shown, in this case c￿ = ((￿ cA;0);(0;￿ cB)) is the only equilibrium in
pure strategies. Next, we show that there is no other equilibrium in mixed






19Note that this statement is also true if we think on mixed-strategy equilibrium.
26VB(Tmax) then, given any mixed strategy for party A, the best response of
party B is to spend all its funds on issue 2. Moreover, since VA(:) is a single-





￿ VA(Tmax), if party B spends all
its funds on issue 2 then the best response of party A is to spend all its funds





￿ VA(Tmin) is analogous.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
Suppose, without loss of generality, that party A has an absolute advan-
tage on both issues. Then by Lemma 3, VA is a single-peaked function of
T(c) (and VB is a single-dipped function of T(c)). Moreover, from the proof




m1!1 = 1. Then, since VA is strictly increasing up to T P, for any m2
there exists m1 large enough so that VA(
￿1(￿ cA)
￿2(￿ cB)) < VA(Tmax). In this case, by
Proposition 2, there exists an equilibrium in pure strategies where party A
spends all its funds on issue 1. Similarly, note that limT P
m2!1 = 0. Since VA
is strictly decreasing for all T(c) > T P, given any m1 there exists m2 large
enough so that VA(
￿1(￿ cB)
￿2(￿ cA)) < VA(Tmin). In this case, by Proposition 2, there is
issue divergence in the political campaign where party A spends all its funds
on issue 2. We can use the same argument for party B.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4:
Suppose, without loss of generality, that party A has an absolute advan-
tage on both issues. From Lemma 3, VA(:) is a single-peaked function of
T(c).
(1) Suppose that, initially, (m1;m2) is located in point a of Figure 8 and
that there exists an equilibrium in pure strategies, c￿, such that party A
spends all its funds on issue 1 and party B spends all its funds on issue
2. Let T1;2 =
￿1(￿ cA)
￿2(￿ cB). Given the political positions in the initial situation,
suppose that there exists T I
1;2 such that VA(T I
1;2) = VA(T1;2), and let T P =
argmax
T(c)2[Tmin;Tmax]
VA(T(c)). From Proposition 2, we have VA (T1;2) ￿ VA(Tmax).
The lines T P, T1;2, Tmax and T I
1;2 de￿ne the location of the indi⁄erent voters in
the initial situation when T(c) is equal to T P, T1;2, Tmax and T I
1;2 respectively.
Note that the line T P must be such that ba and ca are two segments of the
same length. Moreover, since VA(:) is single-peaked with peak in T P and
VA (T1;2) ￿ VA(Tmax), then the line T1;2 must be ￿ atter than the line T P, the
27line T P must be ￿ atter than the line Tmax, and the line Tmax must be ￿ atter
than the line T I
1;2. Note also that, since VA(T I
1;2) = VA(T1;2), the surfaces
above the lines T1;2 and T I
1;2 must be equal (i.e., the surface de￿ned by the
lines de, ef and fd and the surface de￿ned by the lines ge, eh, hi and ig
are equal). Suppose now that the midpoint of the parties￿political positions




2 (the same reasoning applies if the
parties￿political positions on issue 2 decreases), so that the comparative
advantage of party A on issue 1 becomes greater and the new midpoint of
the parties￿political positions is located in point ^ a (suppose that the rest of
parameters do not change, and in particular ^ xA1 ￿ ^ xB1 = xA1 ￿ xB1). Let
^ T P, ^ T1;2, ^ Tmax and ^ T I
1;2 the analogous to T P, T1;2, Tmax and T I
1;2 in the new
situation.20 Note that the lines ^ T1;2 and ^ Tmax must be parallel to the lines






xA2￿xB2 do not change).
Issue 1
Issue 2









































20If there not exists any TI
1;2 such that VA(TI
1;2) = VA(T1;2), then ^ TI
1;2 does not exist
either, and then it follows that c￿ is still an equilibrium (something similar happens if TI
1;2
exists but ^ TI
1;2 does not exist).
28On the other hand, the line ^ T P must be such that the segments ^ b^ a and ^ c^ a
are of the same length, and therefore the line ^ T P must be steeper than the
line T P. Similarly, the surfaces above the lines ^ T1;2 and ^ T I
1;2 must be equal
(i.e., the surface de￿ned by the lines ^ de, e ^ f and ^ f ^ d and the surface de￿ned
by the lines ^ ge, eh, h^ { and ^ {^ g are equal), and therefore the line ^ T I
1;2 must be
steeper than the line T I
1;2. Therefore, ^ T1;2 < ^ T P and ^ Tmax < ^ T I
1;2. Then, in




￿ VA(^ Tmax) and, from Proposition 2, c￿ is still
an equilibrium in pure strategies. The case in which the initial equilibrium
in pure strategies was such that party A spends all its funds on issue 2 is
similar.
(2) Suppose that there exists an equilibrium in pure strategies, c￿, such
that party A spends all its funds on issue 1 and party B spends all its funds
on issue 2. From Proposition 2 we have VA(
￿1(￿ cA)
￿2(￿ cB)) ￿ VA(Tmax), and there-
fore
￿1(￿ cA)
￿2(￿ cB) ￿ T P ￿ Tmax. From the proof of Lemma 3 we know that the
peak of VA is T P =
x2[1￿m2]
x1[1￿m1]. Then, as m2 increases (keeping constant x2),
T P decreases. Since limT P
m2!1 = 0, if m2 increases, at some point we have
VA(Tmax) < VA(
￿1(￿ cA)
￿2(￿ cB)) and VA(Tmin) < VA(
￿1(￿ cB)
￿2(￿ cA)), and then, from Proposi-
tion 2, an equilibrium in pure strategies fails to exist. The case in which
the initial equilibrium in pure strategies was such that party A spends all its
funds on issue 2 is similar.
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